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The Least Restrictive Means
it had not been applied to restaurants where 45 percent of all beef
was sold. It was "not persuaded that Korea could not achieve its de-
sired level of enforcement" by devoting "more resources" to conven-
tional enforcement efforts in the beef sector.N "Violations of laws
and regulations like the Korean Unfair Competition Act can be ex-pected to be routinely investigated and detected through selective,
but well-targeted, controls of potential wrongdoers." ' Finally, even
though alternative enforcement measures "could well entail higher
enforcement costs for the national budget," the alternative Korea had
chosen had "in effect shifted all, or the great bulk, of these potential
costs ... to imported goods and retailers of imported goods," an "on-
erous shifting of enforcement costs which ordinarily are borne by the
Member's public purse."2' Accordingly, the Appellate Body affirmed
the finding that the dual retail system was not "necessary."27
2. EC-Asbestos.
The asbestos dispute arose when France enacted a ban on the
sale of virtually all products containing asbestos in any form. Cana-
dian firms had previously produced and exported to France variousproducts for the construction industry, such as concrete forms rein-
forced with an asbestos-containing fiber. The French regulation put an
end to these exports, and Canada complained that this policy violated
VTO nondiscrimination obligations as well as obligations to eschew
the use of quantitative restrictions on international trade." A dispute
panel agreed with Canada that a violation of these obligations waspresent, but held that the Article XX(b) ° exception for measures
necessary to protect human health was applicable to the ban so that
no ultimate violation of WTO law arose.
On appeal, Canada challenged the panel's reliance on Article
XX(b), contending in particular that a total ban on asbestos-
containing articles was not "necessary" to the protection of human
23 Seeid at 168.
24 Id at 1 180.
25 Id.
26 Id at 181.
27 See id at 1 182.
28 WTO, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products, Report of the Appellate Body, 1 2, 193, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar 12, 2001) ("Canada
has not succeeded in establishing that the [asbestos] measure at issue is inconsistent with the ob-
ligations of the European Communities under the covered agreements.").
29 See id at T 2-3.
30 "[Nlothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforce-
ment by any contracting party of measures ... necessary to protect human, animal or plant life
or health." Reprinted in Jackson, Davey, and Sykes, Document Supplement at 45 (cited in note
4).
31 See EC-Asbestos at I 4(d) (cited in note 28).
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health.32 In this regard it raised four arguments: (1) that the panel
erred in finding that the asbestos-containing products created some
health risk; (2) that the panel could not find that a measure was pro-
tected by Article XX(b) unless it had a quantitative estimate of the
magnitude of the risk that it avoided; (3) that the panel inappropri-
ately characterized the regulatory objective as being a complete halt
to the spread of asbestos-related health risks, as it failed to take ac-
count of the fact that substitute products also created health risks; and
(4) that the panel erred in finding that the "controlled use" of asbes-
tos-containing products was not a reasonably available alternative.
3
The first two arguments are of little interest here and were dis-
pensed with easily by the Appellate Body-the challenge to the find-
ing of a health risk was a challenge to a basic factual finding that
would not be disturbed on appeal, and the suggestion that the risk
must be quantified finds no textual support in Article XX or in prior
cases.' The third and fourth arguments, by contrast, raise more fun-
damental issues and require somewhat greater attention.
Canada's third argument was, in effect, that France had estab-
lished a risk baseline that tolerated some health risk from construc-
tion products like those at issue. Hence, the panel should have asked
whether some less restrictive policy could have achieved the same
level of overall health risk as the situation that prevailed after the ban
on asbestos-containing products. The panel, by contrast, had found
that France's goal was to achieve zero risk from asbestos, and that it
was accordingly "necessary" to ban asbestos-containing goods alto-
gether. The analysis suggested by Canada would have been challeng-
ing to be sure-it would have required a determination as to the
overall health risk associated with substitute products with the ban in
place, and an analysis of whether alternatives to a ban on asbestos-
containing products could achieve a comparable risk level.
The Appellate Body's response is somewhat opaque," but seem-
ingly amounts to the proposition that in a case such as this one, least
restrictive means analysis will not restate the regulatory goal pro-
32 See id at 165.
33 See id.
34 See id at 166-67.
35 The Appellate Body stated:
[Ilt is undisputed that WTO members have the right to determine the level of protection of
health that they consider appropriate in a given situation. France has determined, and the
Panel accepted, that the chosen level of health protection ... is a 'halt' to the spread of as-
bestos-related health risks... Our conclusion is not altered by the fact that [substitute] fi-
bres might pose a risk to health. The scientific evidence before the Panel indicated that the
risk posed by the [substitute] fibres is, in any case, less than the risk posed by ... asbestos
fibres.
Id at 168.
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pounded by a WTO member. If the stated goal is zero risk from asbes-
tos, then WTO law merely inquires whether the measure in question
is necessary to that goal, even if the overall level of health risk is not
zero due to the risks from substitutes, and even if some less restrictive
alternative policy arguably could achieve a comparable overall level
of risk. The implicit constraint is merely that the regulatory policy inquestion cannot exacerbate the risk in relation to the alternatives-
the substitutes cannot create more risk than the products they sup-
plant.i' Regarding Canada's fourth argument about the "controlled
use" of asbestos products as a less restrictive alternative, the Appel-
late Body again addressed the question left open by some of the ear-lier GATT decisions-what does it mean to say that an alternative is
"reasonably available"? It referred briefly to an earlier panel finding
that had not been appealed to the effect that "an alternative measure
did not cease to be 'reasonably' available simply because the alterna-
tive measure involved administrative difficulties."37 It then quoted its
opinion in the Korean beef case regarding the factors relevant to the
"weighing and balancing process," and concluded that:
In this case, the objective pursued by the measure is the preser-
vation of human life and health .... The value pursued is both vi-
tal and important in the highest degree. The remaining question,
then, is whether there is an alternative measure that would
achieve the same end."
The last step was to point to scientific evidence in the record to the ef-fect that "controlled use" (such as ensuring that the demolition of
buildings with the asbestos-containing products are conducted by per-
sonnel wearing protection from airborne asbestos fibers) was not per-
fect." Some risks of asbestos exposure would always remain, andhence controlled use would not achieve the stated health objective. °
3. EC-Hormones.
In the 1980s, European regulators decided that the administra-
tion of growth hormones to beef cattle creates some human health
risk (primarily a risk of cancer), even though scientific evidence of the
risk from small residues was scant at best for most of the hormones in
question. Europe prohibited the use of growth hormones on cattle for
human consumption in Europe, and also prohibited the importation
of beef from other nations that do not ban the use of growth hor-
36 See note 35.
37 Id atJ 169.
38 Id at 172.
39 See id at 174.
40 See id.
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mones. As a result, a number of exporting nations, including the
United States and Canada, were no longer able to sell their beef in
Europe. (The option of certifying beef as hormone-free to the satis-
faction of European regulators was evidently uneconomical.) The dis-
pute simmered for many years, and was quickly brought to the WTO
after its formation" pursuant to the new Agreement on the Applica-
tion of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures which, as noted earlier,
requires Europe to ensure, inter alia, that its food safety regulations
are not more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve its legitimate
regulatory objectives.
I note the case not for what it says on this issue, but for what it
does not say. Although Europe lost the case on other grounds, the par-
ties to the case did not even raise the least restrictive means issue, de-
spite obvious arguments that might have been made in that regard.
Europe had characterized its regulation as a "zero residue" policy. But
rather than understanding the goal as a zero residue objective, it
could have been recharacterized as a zero risk objective. Evidence
might then be adduced to establish that zero risk is achieved at low
level residues (such as those permitted under hormone-residue stan-
dards promulgated by international standardization bodies), and a
regulatory policy tolerating that level of residue might be deemed a
less restrictive alternative. As another possibility, perhaps the regula-
tory objective could be restated as one of ensuring that consumers are
protected against unwitting ingestion of hormone residues that they
might prefer to avoid. Then, perhaps a labeling requirement for hor-
mone-raised beef might be a less restrictive alternative. Yet, these
strategies were not pursued at all. One must be cautious in drawing an
inference about the law from the fact that litigants did not raise an ar-
gument, but the fact that attorneys for the United States opted not to
pursue least restrictive means arguments surely suggests that they saw
little hope for them on these facts.
B. GATT Decisions
Before discussing the implications of the WTO cases, it is useful
to note briefly how the "necessity" issue was resolved in practice by
pre-WTO GATT panels.
41 See WTO, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Report of
the Appellate Body, 11 1, 253, WT/DS/26 & 48/ABJR (Jan 16, 1998) (upholding "the Panel's
finding that the EC measures at issue are inconsistent with the requirements of Article 5.1 of
the SPS Agreement").
[70:403
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1. United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
Section 337 of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930 provides for actions be-
fore the International Trade Commission when the importation of ar-
ticles involves unfair methods of competition.2 It has primarily been
invoked in patent disputes. 3 The European Community challenged a
prior version of the law as a violation of the nondiscrimination obliga-
tions of GATI'." The premise of the challenge was that domestic pat-
ent infringers could only be sued in U.S. courts, while the producers of
imported goods that were alleged to infringe U.S. patents could either
be sued in a court proceeding or subjected to an action under Section
337, which differed with regard to the time frame for the action, the
procedures, and the remedies available.4'5 For example, the remedy in
court was either damages or injunction, while the remedy under Sec-
tion 337 included the possibility of an order directing the Customs
Service to bar the offending goods from entering the United States.'
The dispute panel found that impermissible discrimination was
indeed present, and proceeded to consider whether the United States
had a defense under Article XX(d), treating the patent laws generally
as "laws ... not inconsistent with [GAT]. '" 7 By and large, the fea-
tures of Section 337 that might disadvantage respondents relative to
an action in U.S. court were held not to be "necessary" to the en-
forcement of the patent laws. The fact that Section 337 cases pro-
ceed much more quickly, for example, could not be justified as essen-
tial to the enforcement of the law-if speed was essential, why only
when the infringing goods were imported?
49
The only feature of Section 337 that the panel felt might be "nec-
essary" was the in rem remedy, and the opportunity for orders to be
issued to the Customs Service to exclude offending goods.'O The panel
reasoned that in personam remedies might be ignored or evaded by
foreign producers who were not subject to arrest in the United States
and might have no assets to be seized by U.S. authorities.' The only
viable option for preventing the sale of infringing goods, therefore,
might be to exclude them from U.S. markets.52
42 See United States-Section 337 of the TariffAct of 1930 at 1 2.2 (cited in note 6).
43 See id.
44 Idat 1.3.
45 See id at 1 2.8.
46 See id at 2.8(I).
47 Id at 1 5.22.
48 See id at I T 5.28-5.30.
49 See id.
50 See id at 1 5.31-5.33.
51 See id.
52 See id.
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2. Thailand- Cigarettes.
Thailand engaged in a number of regulatory practices that disad-
vantaged foreign sellers of cigarettes. Most prominently, Thailand re-
quired import licenses to be issued before cigarettes could be im-
ported, and allegedly had refused to issue any such licenses for a dec-
ade."
Thailand defended its practices on two grounds. First, it argued
that the government was concerned about the adverse health impact
from the growing use of cigarettes by the Thai population.4 Second, it
argued that imported cigarettes contained certain additional chemi-
cals, such as those designed to lower tar and nicotine content, that
might pose a health risk." Both arguments were claimed to afford a
defense to the challenged practices under GATT Article XX(d).6
The panel ruled that the discriminatory treatment of imported
cigarettes could not possibly be "necessary" to the goal of curtailing
smoking." It noted that a number of nondiscriminatory alternatives
could be employed to that end-measures that raise the prices of all
cigarettes uniformly, for example, or that restrict advertising uni-
formly." Regarding the argument that imported cigarettes contained
potentially dangerous chemicals or additives, the panel also concluded
that an outright ban on imports was not "necessary" to address the
problem." It suggested that Thailand could simply ban cigarettes con-
taining specific additives that were dangerous or unhealthy, and as to
other additives it could employ nondiscriminatory labeling require-
ments that ensured disclosure to the consumer.6
3. United States- Marine Mammal Protection Act
(Tuna-Dolphin).
The Tuna-Dolphin case involved, among other things, a U.S. stat-
ute that prohibited the importation of tuna caught using certain fish-
ing methods that kill dolphins.6' The statute applied to all tuna im-ports, even if the fish were caught in international waters or in the ter-
53 See Thailand- Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes at 6
(cited in note 7).
54 Seeidat 21.
55 See id at 28.
56 See id at 11 21,28.
57 Seeid at 181.
58 See id at 1$ 78-80.
59 See id at 91 77.
60 See id.
61 United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 39th Supp GATT BISD 155, 1 2.5, 7.1
(1993) (not adopted) (concluding that the "prohibition of imports of certain yellowfin tuna...
and the provisions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act under which it is imposed are
contrary to Article XI:1 and are not justified by Article XX(b) or Article XX(g)").
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ritorial waters of another nation. It was challenged as a violation of
GATT nondiscrimination obligations, or alternatively as a violation of
GATT commitments regarding quantitative restrictions.? In a report
that was never adopted in the GATT and that accordingly never be-
came binding, the Panel found violations of GATT commitments and
proceeded to consider whether the United States could invoke an Ar-
ticle XX exception.?
Among other things, the United States argued that its policy was
"necessary" to protect animal health under Article XX(b).4 Much of
the discussion on this point centered on whether the United States
could invoke Article XX(b) with respect to animals outside of its ju-
risdiction, but the report also contained some discussion of the "ne-
cessity" test.? In particular, the panel noted that one important and
highly trade-restrictive feature of U.S. law did not appear to be "nec-
essary":
The United States linked the maximum incidental dolphin taking
rate which Mexico had to meet during a particular period in or-
der to be able to export tuna to the United States to the taking
rate actually recorded for United States fisherman during the
same period. Consequently, the Mexican authorities could not
know whether, at a given point in time, their policies conformed
to the United States's dolphin protection standards.6
In addition, the panel held that the United States had not shown that
it had exhausted other avenues for the protection of dolphins, "in par-
ticular through the negotiation of international cooperative arrange-
ments, which would seem to be desirable in view of the fact that dol-
phins roam the waters of many states and the high seas."'67
C. Implications
Although the number of cases over the history of the
WTO/GATT system applying a least restrictive means test is small,
the cases to date are consistent in my view with the proposition that
the test is a crude form of cost-benefit balancing that is highly atten-
tive to error costs and uncertainty. By "crude," I mean that the WTO
decisionmaker does not actually quantify the costs and benefits of al-
ternative regulatory policies in dollars or some other metric. Rather,
the decisionmaker proceeds more impressionistically and qualita-
62 Idat 13.1.
63 See id at 1 5.18,5.23.
64 Idat1 5.24.
65 See id at 1 5.25.
66 Idat 15.28.
67 Id.
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tively to assess the effect of alternative policies on trade, the adminis-
trative difficulties and resource costs associated with alternative poli-
cies, and the regulatory efficacy of those policies. It then weighs these
considerations in making a decision.
The attention to error costs and uncertainty is evident in the
hesitancy of decisionmakers to hold that an alternative is less restric-
tive (or that the challenged policy is not "necessary") if the alterna-
tive policy may be less efficacious and if the value of regulatory effi-
cacy is great. Thus, for example, if the regulatory objective relates to
some highly valued interest such as the protection of human life, then
the challenged regulation will be upheld if there is any doubt as to the
ability of the proposed alternative to achieve the same level of effi-
cacy. This practice may be understood as a recognition of the fact that
the costs of an erroneous decision-loss of life-would be extremely
high, and that even a small probability of an erroneous decision coun-
sels against condemning the measure under scrutiny.
By contrast, where the regulatory objective relates to some less
important interest, and the proposed alternative is considerably less
restrictive of trade, decisionmakers can condemn a challenged regula-
tion even when the efficacy of the proposed alternative regulation
may be less than the efficacy of the challenged regulation. Likewise,
where an alternative regulation is clearly less restrictive of trade and
there is no doubt as to its efficacy in achieving regulatory goals, the
mere fact that it is somewhat more costly for regulators to implement
will not prevent the decisionmaker from condemning the challenged
regulation. These last observations make clear that the "narrow" con-
ditions set forth in the introduction to this Essay need not hold before
a less restrictive alternative may be found, and further indicate that
an important degree of (crude) cost-benefit balancing is involved in
the analysis.
Each of the adopted decisions to date fits nicely within this
framework. In Korea-Beef, the dual retail system may well have
made it easier for regulators to prevent the passing off of imported
meat for domestic meat. Korea argued that before the system was put
in place, fraud was difficult to police because once beef was unpacked
it was largely impossible to determine its origin. Likewise, the alterna-
tive of trying to police fraud through spot inspections may have been
more expensive. Nevertheless, in the face of evidence that the dual re-
tail system had constrained the number of outlets for the imported
product and significantly reduced its sales, the policing method that
Korea employed to deal with other forms of consumer fraud was
deemed less restrictive. The result may be explained by the fact that
the cost of fraud to consumers-unwitting consumption of imported
[70:403
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rather than domestic beef-was clearly modest at best. Any reduction
in the efficacy of regulation was thus of little moment.
In EC-Asbestos, Canada argued forcefully that asbestos was of
no danger unless airborne, and that carefully "controlled use" of its
construction products with embedded asbestos fibers would protect
against any hazard. The market should decide whether the extra costs
of controlled use were worth incurring. But the European response
that the absolute efficacy of controlled use had not been established
in all settings, and that the products might fall into the hands of indi-
viduals who did not follow sound "controlled use" guidelines, carried
the day. It was enough that the proposed alternative might not be as
effective as a complete ban on the products, and that the health haz-
ard was real. Likewise, neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body
would accept Canada's attempt to recharacterize the regulatory ob-
jective as some (non-zero) overall level of health risk based on the
risks that France would apparently tolerate from substitute products.
To do so would have embroiled them in an error-fraught task of trying
to determine whether the residual hazard with controlled use was less
than or greater than the hazards from substitutes.
Given the decision in EC-Asbestos, it seems that attorneys for
the United States in EC-Hormones were right to eschew least re-
strictive means arguments. They too would have rested on an attempt
to recharacterize the regulatory objective in Europe as zero risk
rather than zero residue, or perhaps as informed choice. Considering
the health risk at stake, any serious possibility that positive hormone
residues create a health hazard would almost certainly have pre-
vented a finding that international residue standards or labeling re-
quirements were a less restrictive alternative. The only realistic hope
for the United States, therefore, was to show that the zero residue
standard was completely unjustified from a scientific standpoint, and
violated a different requirement in the Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures Agreement-a requirement that measures be based on a
scientific risk assessment.6' Success on that front would make the
least restrictive means argument superfluous, while failure on that
front would surely have doomed the least restrictive means analysis
as well.
Although the old GATT cases are not legally "binding" in the
WTO, at least the adopted panel reports from GATT have some per-
suasive authority. It is instructive to note that the results in these early
68 For more on the hormones case and the role of scientific evidence requirements in
WTO law, see Alan 0. Sykes, Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty and Scientific Evidence Re-
quirements: A Pessimistic View, 3 Chi J Intl L 353, 358-61 (2002) (discussing the Appellate
Body's analysis in ruling that the European prohibition of meat products from cattle raised with
growth hormones violated the scientific evidence requirement).
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cases comport with the approach of the WTO cases-indeed, they are
for the most part extremely easy cases in which the existence of less
restrictive alternatives could hardly be contested under any standard.
In US. -Section 337, it was impossible to explain why most of the
rules that discriminated against foreign firms alleged to have in-
fringed U.S. patents contributed to any legitimate regulatory objec-
tive. A fortiori, nondiscriminatory alternatives were less restrictive.
The one exception-in rem remedies-had no plausible substitute in
cases where the foreign infringer could not be reached personally due
to the absence of any physical or financial presence in the United
States. And it was difficult to imagine how an in rem measure at the
border could be applied on a nondiscriminatory basis to domestic
goods.
Thailand- Cigarettes is similar in important respects. The
discriminatory treatment of imported goods was not plausibly needed
if the goal was to reduce smoking. Indeed, measures that raised the
price or restricted the quantity of imports but not domestic substi-
tutes are plainly inferior to measures that raise price or restrict quan-
tity across the board. As for the purported health concerns of the Thai
government about the additives in foreign cigarettes, Thailand was
free to enact a nondiscriminatory ban on cigarettes containing any
additive that was thought to pose a health hazard, and to require dis-
closure of all additives. Even though health concerns were at issue,
therefore, there seemed to be no uncertainty about the adequacy of
trade neutral measures to take care of them.
Tuna-Dolphin, the one unadopted decision noted here, also in-
volved a practice that had no plausible justification as an animal
health measure -a regulation that conditioned the right to import on
an incidental dolphin kill requirement that was only revealed after
foreign fishermen had landed their catch. Whatever the permissible
threat to dolphins, there was no reason why it could not be specified
in advance. The one dimension of the case that is rather unusual is the
suggestion that prior negotiation to achieve a cooperative solution
was needed before the United States could unilaterally require other
nations to comply with its dolphin protection policy as a condition of
69the right to export to the United States. Without more details on the
69 This idea resurfaced in a more recent WTO case, albeit not in the context of a least re-
strictive means analysis. See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, Report of the Appellate Body, 172, 187, WT/DS58/AB/R (Nov 6, 1998) (stating
that "the failure of the United States to pursue negotiations for establishing consensual means
of protection and conservation of the living marine resources here involved" rose to the level of
"unjustifiable discrimination"; and concluding that the United States protective measure was
"not justified under Article XX of the GAT[ 1994"). This case involved measures to protect sea
turtles, prohibiting shrimp imports from nations that used shrimping methods deemed unsafe for
the turtle population by the United States. The Panel and the Appellate Body found that the
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contours of such a requirement-how long must negotiation be given
to succeed, what if other nations do not give in to U.S. demands, and
so on-it is difficult to know whether this requirement is onerous or
trivial, and thus difficult to evaluate its relationship to the framework
developed here.
The reader may complain that I have given too little attention to
competing hypotheses. The most obvious alternative might be the hy-
pothesis that least restrictive means analysis in the WTO is political
cover for motive review-that its real function is to identify policies
motivated by protectionism rather than by some legitimate, non-
protectionist objective. A similar suggestion has been advanced with
reference to the cases decided under the dormant Commerce Clause
of the U.S. Constitution."
Undeniably, at least some of the cases discussed above could be
viewed as consistent with this hypothesis as well. But without going
on at length, I reject it because the WTO has shown itself more than
willing to condemn practices that have clear nonprotectionist origins
(as in the EC-Hormones case"). There is little reason to think that
least restrictive means analysis is more cabined in this respect than
other inquiries under WTO law. Nevertheless, an ideal test case for
discriminating among these hypotheses remains to be decided.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has argued that least restrictive means analysis in the
WTO/GATT system to date is roughly co-extensive with (crude) cost-
benefit analysis. The analysis gives great weight to the presence of un-
certainty about the efficacy of regulatory alternatives when a vital in-
terest like human health is genuinely at stake, but this feature too
comports with the logic of cost-benefit analysis under uncertainty. It is
an open question whether least restrictive means analysis works simi-
larly in other legal contexts. One suspects that it does, but systematic
exploration of that issue remains for future research.
United States had negotiated agreements regarding the protection of sea turtles with some na-
tions but had made no attempt to negotiate them with others, and thus engaged in "unjustifiable
discrimination" in violation of the chapeau to Article XX. See id at 11 166-72.
70 See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 Mich L Rev 1091, 1206-84 (1986) (arguing that the Supreme
Court, in its dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, has been concerned exclusively with
preventing state protectionism).
71 The regulations in question there were promulgated after well-publicized incidents in
which the ingestion of beef from cattle treated with the hormone DES produced some nasty
health issues. See Sykes, Product Standards at 16-17 (cited in note 2).
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Hume's Second-Best Constitutionalism
Adrian Vermeulet
In the economic and political science literature on constitutional
choice and constitutional design, David Hume is almost invariably as-
sociated with a master principle of design that is congenial to rational-
actor approaches. I shall call this the knavery principle. As Hume put
it, "in contriving any system of government, and fixing the several
checks and controuls of the constitution, every man ought to be sup-
posed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private
interest."' The knavery principle is, however, untenable, as I shall sub-
sequently discuss. So it might seem that Hume has nothing valuable to
tell us about constitutional design.
My concern here is to dispel that impression, and by so doing to
reevaluate and vindicate Hume's contributions. I shall argue that
Hume's principal contribution is not the knavery principle. Indeed
one of his major claims about the British constitutional order was that
it violated the principle, and one of his major projects was to explain
how the mixed British constitution could nonetheless retain its stabil-
ity. Hume's real contribution, rather, is to have pioneered the critical
idea of second-best constitutionalism: the idea that multiple depar-
tures from the optimal or first-best constitutional arrangements might
offset each other, producing compensating adjustments that ensure
constitutional equilibrium. Hume's characteristic mode of analysis, I
shall suggest, is simultaneously to identify both a departure from op-
timal constitutional design and an offsetting institutional adjustment
that compensates for the initial defect.
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Thanks to David Currie, Jack Goldsmith,
Don Herzog, Eric Posner, David Strauss, Cass Sunstein, and participants at a University of Vir-
ginia workshop for helpful comments, to Eric Truett for excellent research assistance, and to the
Russell J. Parsons Research Fund for financial support. Special thanks to Yun Soo Vermeule.
1 David Hume, Of the Independency of Parliament, in David Hume, Essays: Moral, Politi-
cal, and Literary 42 (Liberty Fund 1985) (Eugene F. Miller, ed). For works associating Hume with
the knavery principle, see Lewis A. Kornhauser, Virtue and Self-Interest in the Design of Constitu-
tional Institutions, 3 Theor Inq in L 15-16 (2002); Franklin A. Kalinowski, David Hume on the
Phiosophic Underpinnings of Interest Group Politics, 25 Polity 355, 369-74 (1993); David M.
Kirkham, European Sources of American Constitutional Thought before 1787,3 USAFA J Legal
Stud 1, 22 (1992). For other versions of the knavery principle, see John Stuart Mill, Considera-
tions on Representative Government, in 19 Collected Works of John Stuart Mill: Essays on Politics
and Society 371, 505 (Toronto 1977) (J.M. Robson, ed); Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace 29-30
(Bobbs-Merrill 1957) (Lewis white Beck, ed).
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The idea of second-best constitutionalism has important implica-
tions for American constitutional law. Many positions and arguments,
in both structural constitutional law and the law of constitutional
rights, appeal to the second-best idea of compensating adjustments; I
shall canvass these arguments and indicate the principal lines of
methodological criticism that can be advanced against them. Most im-
portantly, the ubiquity of compensating adjustments does not entail
that any particular constitutional actor should attempt to supply such
adjustments, least of all judges deciding constitutional cases. I shall
suggest that Hume's conception of second-best constitutionalism im-
plies (or is at least compatible with) a modest conception of constitu-
tional adjudication: Compensating adjustments should be welcomed
where they exist, but judges ought not attempt to identify and pro-
mote them. If judicial attempts to engineer improvements to the con-
stitutional structure often make things worse, not better, then a sec-
ond-best account of constitutional adjudication itself entails that
judges should ignore substantive second-best arguments in constitu-
tional decisionmaking.
Two caveats are appropriate. First, the point of studying Hume's
constitutionalism is presentist, not historical. I mean to plunder Hume
for ideas with fertile applications, and I shall disregard historical fidel-
ity if there is an opportunity to interpret or reconstruct Humean ideas
in ways that enhance their present utility. Second, I shall focus on
Hume's analysis of collective behavior and its institutional determi-
nants, largely ignoring the extensive literature on Humean moral and
political psychology at the level of individuals. Hume's psychology,
with its distinctions among reason, passion, and interest, had great in-
fluence on the Framers,2 but I shall leave the originalist implications of
Hume's ideas unexplored.
Part I explains the important failings of the knavery principle.
Part II examines Hume's characteristic analytic style, with its appeals
to offsetting violations of ideal institutional design. Part III turns from
British to American constitutionalism, fleshing out the Humean idea
of second-best constitutionalism and examining its implications for
contemporary constitutional interpretation and adjudication. A brief
conclusion follows.
2 See, for example, Morton White, Philosophy, The Federalist, and the Constitution 13-22
(Oxford 1987); Douglass Adair, "That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science": David Hume,
James; Madison, and the Tenth Federalist, 20 Huntington Library Q 343, 348-57 (1957) (describ-
ing the influence of Hume on Madison's writings on factions).
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I. KNAVES AND KNIGHTS
The initial puzzle is why anyone might endorse the knavery prin-
ciple as a master principle of constitutional design. As Hume puts it,
"[I]t appears somewhat strange, that a maxim should be true in poli-
tics, which is false in fact."3 It is not true that public officials, or for that
matter people generally, always pursue rational self-interest, except in
the tautological sense that reduces altruistic behavior and morally-
motivated behavior to interdependent utility functions' and a "taste
for fairness,"5 respectively. In Hamilton's words, the "assumption of
universal venality in human nature is little less an error in political
reasoning, than the supposition of universal rectitude."6 But the em-
pirical question turns out to be a distraction. The standard defense of
the principle, stemming from work in the economics of constitutional
choice, casts it as a methodological commitment rather than an em-
pirical claim. The knavery principle is factually erroneous, yet (on this
view) represents the best postulate by which to assess constitutional-
design proposals.
The methodological defense of the principle rests on four claims.7
First is a claim from symmetry or parsimony: If people are best mod-
eled as rational maximizers of self-interest in explicit markets, the
same model should be applied to implicit political markets. By itself
the appeal to symmetry does not, of course, tell us whether rational
self-interest is the correct uniform assumption to use, but the implicit
claim is that explicit markets can't sensibly be modeled on any other
assumption. Second is a kind of maximin argument, or more loosely
an argument based on avoiding the worst-case scenario: If the harms
from self-interested official behavior are greater than the benefits of
public-spirited official behavior-if knaves do more harm than
knights do good -then constitutional rules should be designed on pes-
simistic assumptions to minimize the worst possible outcomes rather
than to maximize the best possible outcomes. Third is a selection
claim: Just as non-profit-maximizing behavior is driven out of explicit
markets by the bankruptcy of non-profit-maximizing firms, so too
public-regarding behavior will be driven out of political markets be-
3 Hume, Independency of Parliament at 42-43 (cited in note 1).
4 See, for example, Harold M. Hochman and James D. Rodgers, Pareto Optimal Redistri-
bution, 59 Am Econ Rev 542,542-43 (1969) (using assumptions of interdependent preferences to
model redistribution).
5 Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare 11-12 (Harvard 2002).
6 Federalist 76 (Hamilton), in Benjamin Fletcher Wright, ed, The Federalist 480,483 (Har-
vard 1966).
7 These claims are advanced in Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan, The Reason of
Rules: Constitutional Political Economy 46-66 (Cambridge 1985), and qualified or repudiated in
Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, Democratic Devices and Desires 17-33 (Cambridge 2000).
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cause public-regarding officials will lose out to officials who strictly
maximize success in elections and other competitive selection proc-
esses. Fourth is an analogy to Gresham's law: Self-interested behavior
will drive out public-spirited behavior, not by selection processes, but
by forcing public-spirited actors to behave as though they were self-
interested, simply to protect themselves from the depredations of
their self-interested competitors.
All of these claims are questionable. Methodologically, symmetry
or parsimony is always at best a weak and defeasible commitment; it
counsels the theorist to reject unnecessary complexity, adopting like
assumptions to model like settings, but the opposite counsel is that the
theorist should reject excessive simplicity, and should tailor his as-
sumptions to capture relevant differences in different settings.8 To
treat explicit markets and politics under identical assumptions if the
two domains are governed by fundamentally different forces is just as
much a mistake as it is to treat them under different assumptions if
the two domains are fundamentally similar. The appeal to symmetry,
then, is parasitic on a suppressed judgment, or guess, that the same
motivations do in fact dominate both political and economic institu-
tions.
Substantively, the knavery principle is excessively static. It ignores
critical dynamic effects, by virtue of which the best maxim for consti-
tutional design may be to assume that public actors are at least het-
erogeneous in their motivations, rather than uniformly self-interested.
To design institutions on pessimistic assumptions about the motiva-
tions of public actors may simply create a self-fulfilling expectation,
one that itself causes public actors to hold the self-interested motiva-
tions that the knavery principle attributes to them. Two mechanisms
produce this self-fulfilling expectation: the endogeneity of official mo-
tivations and the selection effects of institutional design.9
First, the self-interest assumption may crowd out public-spirited
motivations.' Providing material rewards for altruistic behavior may
reduce the incidence of the desired behavior if actors are altruistically
motivated." The reward reduces the cost of the behavior, but the off-
setting effect is that the provision of the reward reduces the utility
that public-spirited actors derive from performing it, if the reward
suggests that the behavior is motivated by venality rather than altru-
8 See Albert 0. Hirschman, Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating Some
Categories of Economic Discourse, 1 Econ & Phil 7,8-9,20 (1985).
9 See Kornhauser, 3 Theor Inq in L at 18-19 (cited in note 1).
10 See Bruno S. Frey, A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues, 107 Econ J 1043,
1044-45 (1997).
11 See Richard Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy 223
(Pantheon 1971).
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ism. Conversely, on the punishment side, attaching material sanctions
to self-interested behavior may increase the incidence of the unde-
sired behavior. Punishment increases the relative cost of the behavior,
but there are potential offsetting effects here as well: The implicit an-
nouncement that "a fine is a price' ', 2 may undermine moral or social
norms that otherwise inhibit the behavior, and may signal that viola-
tions of the rule are widespread, thus implying that only chumps or
suckers voluntarily comply. In both cases, material sanctions premised
on the assumption of self-interested behavior can inhibit the internali-
zation of public-spirited motivations. Designing institutions for knaves
may itself beget knaves.
These crowding-out effects suppose that the identity of public of-
ficials is held constant, but that the motivations of officials are en-
dogenous. Public-spirited motivations are driven out by institutional
structures even though the officeholders would have held public-
spirited motivations under alternative structures. A second class of
dynamic models reverses these assumptions, holding motivations con-
stant while treating the identity or selection of officials as endoge-
nous."3 Even if actors' motivations are exogenously fixed, the knavery
principle may effect its self-fulfilling prophecy through the selection of
selfishly motivated actors from a heterogeneous pool of selfish and
unselfish candidates. Altruistic actors experience a differential cost
from operating in an environment that supposes all actors to be self-
ish; imagine a public-spirited official whose opportunities to serve the
public interest are frustrated by the elaborate monitoring devices put
in place to check selfishly motivated officials.' Altruistic actors who
anticipate this differential cost of officeholding will invest less in seek-
ing public office, all else equal, and will thus tend to leave the field to
selfishly-motivated actors who experience no such costs. This reverses
the selection argument for the knavery principle: Designing institu-
tions for knaves creates a system in which knaves operate comfortably,
while knights decline to take public office.
12 Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J Legal Stud 1, 14 (2000) (finding
that the number of late parents at day care increased after a fine for lateness was implemented,
and concluding that "[n]o guilt or shame .. can be attached to the act of buying a commodity at
will").
13 See Brennan and Hamlin, Democratic Devices and Desires at 87-97 (cited in note 7);
Geoffrey Brennan, Selection and the Currency of Reward, in Robert E. Goodin, ed, The Theory
of Institutional Design 256,258 (Cambridge 1996).
14 For examples of this frustration, see Philip K. Howard, The Lost Art of Drawing the
Line: How Fairness Went Too Far 129-31 (Random House 2001).
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II. HUME ON BRITISH CONSTITUTIONALISM
If the knavery principle is untenable, at least in any simple form,
what can we learn from Hume about constitutional political econ-
omy? A great deal, I argue, even though Hume provides no overarch-
ing master principle of constitutional design. In this Part, I shall iden-
tify what I take to be the characteristic structure of Humean constitu-
tional argument: Given an irreversible departure from, or violation of,
ideal constitutional design, the best response is not to approximate the
ideal as closely as possible by adopting its remaining components.
Rather, the best response is to violate the ideal along some other mar-
gin, in order to produce an offsetting condition or compensating ad-
justment. In Part II.A, I illustrate the argument in the setting of insti-
tutional competition between Commons and monarchy, while in Part
II.B, I do the same in other settings.
A. Commons and Monarchy
As an exegetical matter, the casual attribution of the knavery
principle to Hume is misleading. Although Hume endorses the princi-
ple as a "just political maxim" established by "[p]olitical writers," his
interest in the principle is complex and ambivalent." Hume elaborates
it to mean that constitutional arrangements must, "by the skilful divi-
sion of power," ensure that no one institution of government may ac-
crete so much power as to allow it to exercise unchecked sway over
the whole." The critical puzzle for Hume is that the British constitu-
tion of his day violated the knavery principle, yet maintained itself as
an ongoing arrangement. Here I shall examine both the violation that
Hume discerned and the compensating condition that stabilized the
mixed constitutional order.
In Hume's view, a major source of the instability of constitutions
generally is an imbalance between formal or legal power and the de
facto power conferred by property. Social actors lacking legal power
who accrue great wealth can eventually leverage their wealth to de-
stabilize or even overturn nominal constitutional arrangements.
Hume's view is nuanced; he concedes that if the original constitution
of the state allots no power to groups that subsequently become dif-
ferentially wealthy, then "[a] Government may endure for several
ages, though the balance of power, and the balance of property do not
coincide,"'7 because property holders will lack any pretext for seizing
nominal authority. Yet where the original constitution grants "any
15 Hume, Independency of Parliament at 42-43 (cited in note 1).
16 Id.
17 David Hume, Of the First Principles of Government, in Hume, Essays 32, 35 (cited in
note 1).
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